【RIEM Seminar Series No.274】Information Provision and Employment Relationship
Title: Information Provision and Employment Relationship Speaker: Bing YE, Zhejiang University Host: Jianyu Yu, Associate professor, RIEM Time: 14:30-16:00, June 19, Friday Venue: Yide H513, Liulin Campus Abstract:We examine the choice of employment relationship for a two-period production process in which initially both parties do not know the ability of the agent for the task and where the principal has the option to costlessly provide precise information on the agent's ability to the agent. We find that the principal prefers to have a flexible employment relationship with information provision if the project is large, a flexible relationship but no information provision if the project is medium and otherwise an exclusive relationship with information provision. Application to the theory of theory is briefly explored.
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