Title: Type revelation and cooperation Speaker: Yang Yang, Sun Yat-sen University Host: Pinghan Liang, Associate professor, RIEM Time: 14:30-16:00, April 22, Friday Venue: Yide building H511, Liulin Campus Abstract: This paper studies a two-round prisoner’s dilemma game with rematching between rounds. The game involves two player types, ‘Giver’ and ‘Taker’, with the former having more cooperative intrinsic preferences than the latter. Two information conditions are compared: in one, player types are revealed before actions are chosen. In the other, types remain private information. We study this game using perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) analysis and a laboratory experiment. The lab observations support the perfect PBE prediction that, 1) when the types are revealed, the Givers discriminate over types while the Takers don't; 2) when the types are not revealed, Givers and Takers both only discriminate over opponents’ past choices in the second round. However, while the theory predicts a higher cooperation rate would be achieved when the type information are not revealed, the experimental results show the opposite. We argue that the observations imply that indirect reciprocity and bounded rationality combine to drive the decisions away from the equilibrium prediction.